CHARLESTON – The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has issued a ruling regarding the prosecution's obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence during plea negotiations.
In the appeal to the state Supreme Court, the court ruled that Joseph A. Buffey's due process rights were violated, which would allow him to withdraw a 2002 guilty plea in a rape and robbery he had always maintained he did not commit.
Chief Justice Margaret Workman authored the majority opinion. Justice Allen Loughry concurred and issued his concurring opinion.
Buffey appealed a June 3, 2014, order of Harrison Circuit Court denying his amended petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, subsequent to a 2002 guilty plea to two counts of sexual assault and one count of robbery.
"The petitioner contends the circuit court erred in denying his requested relief," the majority opinion states. "Upon a thorough review of the record presented to this court, the arguments of counsel and applicable precedent, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand this matter for entry of an order granting habeas relief and permitting withdrawal of the petitioner’s guilty plea."
On Nov. 30, 2001, at approximately 6:30 a.m., L.L., a Clarksburg resident, awoke in the bedroom of her home ans saw an intruder standing beside her bed. At the time, L.L. was an 83-year-old woman who lived alone and she claimed the intruder told her he needed her money and that he had a large knife and a flashlight.
L.L. informed the intruder that her money was on the first floor and he forced her out of bed to accompany him down the stairs, through the hallway and into the kitchen. L.L. gave him all of the cash in her purse, which was a total of $9 and he then took her back upstairs to search for more money and informed her that he had been there before.
The intruder then sexually assaulted her when they returned to her bedroom, then tied her hands behind her back and told her not to call anyone for 20 minutes, before leaving.
When L.L. freed herself, she called her son, who was a Clarksburg police officer, and three police officers responded to the call and transported her to the hospital.
L.L. was interviewed by a sexual assault nurse at the hospital, where she described the crime in detail and when she was asked if there were multiple assailands, she said there were not. She provided a detailed, tape-recorded statement to the police later that day.
On Dec. 7, 2001, Buffey, then 19 years old, was arrested for three non-violent breaking and entering offenses at businesses in downtown Clarksburg and, when questioned for nine hours, he admitted his involvement in the burglary offenses. One of the businesses was located three-tenths of a mile from L.L.'s home.
Buffey repeatedly stated that he did not commit the robbery and assault of L.L. After hours of questioning, Buffey told the officer that he had broken into an "old lady's house" but that he did not recall any sexual assault. He provided limited details, but they were inconsistent with L.L.'s account of the robbery and assault.
He later recanted the home break-in, saying that he made up the story because they were breathing down his neck.
On Dec. 18, 2001, Thomas G. Dyer was appointed to represent Buffey and, according to testimony later adduced at hearings on his request for habeas relief, he admitted to Dyer that he had participated in three non-violent break-ins, but had no involvement in the sexual assault and robbery.
Buffey further informed Dyer that he had an alibi as he had returned to a motel to spend the night after the Salvation Army break-in.
The petitioner was then indicted for the robbery and sexual assault, including five separate counts of first-degree sexual assault, with a potential minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of 35 years on each count, and one county of first-degree robbery with a possible 10-year minimum and indeterminate maximum sentence.
On Jan. 29, 2002, Dyer filed a motion to compel production of discoverable materials, notimg that the state had been ordered to produce all discoverable information related to the alleged sexual assault within seven days of arraignment and had not yet done so.
Lt. Brent Myers of the West Virginia State Police Forensic Laboratory received L.L.'s rape kit and began his DNA evaluation on Jan. 22, 2002, and by Feb. 8, 2002, he had tentatively concluded that the DNA did not belong to Buffey. On Feb. 9, 2002, he noted the possibility of more than one male DNA source, however, that secondary source did not appear to be Buffey.
On April 5, 2002, Myers completed his report, concluding that the DNA evidence did not belong to Buffey and the report was mailed to Det. Robert Matheny of the Clarksburg Police Department on July 12, 2002.
The Supreme Court ruled that a defendant’s constitutional due process rights, as outlined in Brady vs. Maryland, extend to the plea negotiation stage.
The prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant at the plea bargaining stage, instead of at trial, the latter point being more clearly defined in the U. S. Supreme Court’s case law since Brady.
"This court is presented with a situation in which a defendant repeatedly requested the results of DNA testing; was incorrectly informed that such testing was not yet complete; and was presented with a time-limited plea offer that he accepted upon advice of counsel," the opinion states. "We find that the DNA results were favorable, suppressed and material to the defense. Thus, the petitioner's due process rights, as enunciated in Brady, were violated by the state's suppression of that exculpatory evidence.
The Supreme Court found that the state's failure to disclose favorable DNA test results obtained six weeks prior to the petitioner's plea hearing violated Buffey's due process rights, to his prejudice.
The court reversed the June 3, 2014, order of Harrison Circuit Court and remanded the matter for an order granting habeas relief and permitting Buffey to withdraw his guilty plea.
In his concurring opinion, Loughry stated that his agreement with the majority's procedural-based resolution should not be read to suggest that the relief being granted in this case is driven by evidentiary proof of the petitioner's guilt or innocence.
"As the United States Supreme Court long ago made clear, 'the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,'" his opinion states.
Loughry said he wrote separately to emphasize the role of the prosecutor and the potentially devastating effects when the prosecutor fails to act in the interests of justice.
He goes on to explain the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of a prosecutor, stating that the prosecutor is the "representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."
"When the State fails in this obligation, it is not only the rights of the individual defendant that are compromised, but the public’s confidence in our system of justice as well," Loughry states. "This is not merely a high-minded academic proposition. The public’s ever-eroding confidence in our system of justice is well- documented as the images of the good, honest, hard-working police officers, prosecutors, and judges are often tarnished as a result of the improper actions of a few unscrupulous public servants."
Loughry stated that his concern regarding the state’s conduct in this case is rooted in the observation that It is as much the prosecutor’s duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
"There is simply no room in our judicial system for unethical evidentiary gamesmanship," he said. "The critical need to prevent the prosecution from employing ethically dubious methods to achieve a conviction is proven where, as here, the suppressed evidence, under any reasonable construction, qualifies as exculpatory in nature."
Allan N. Karlin, one of Buffey's attorneys, said that he, and the other attorneys, were gratified that the state Supreme Court issued such a strong and powerful opinion on the right to due process in West Virginia.
"This brings us one important step closer to justice for Joe Buffey,” Karlin said in a press release issued by the Innocence Project.
Nina Morrison, another of Buffey's attorneys, said the state's Supreme Court corrected a grave injustice.
"In this landmark decision, West Virginia’s high court not only corrected a grave injustice that had occurred in its own criminal courts, but became a leading voice in a national conversation about innocence and guilty pleas that is taking place all over the country,” Morrison said.
Buffey was represented by Karlin; and Morrison and Barry C. Scheck of the Innocence Project.
Warden David Ballard was represented by Assistant Prosecuting Attorney David Romano and Assistant Prosecuting Attorney James F. Armstrong.
W.Va. Supreme Court of Appeals case number 14-0642
