CHARLESTON – The state Supreme Court says the case regarding the residency requirements for the governor can continue in Kanawha Circuit Court.
In a November 20 ruling, the justices denied Gov. Jim Justice’s writ of prohibition to overturn rulings previously made by Kanawha Circuit Judge Charlie King in the case.
“We conclude that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County had jurisdiction, did not exceed its legitimate powers and did not clearly err when it denied Governor Justice’s motion to dismiss Mr. (Isaac) Sponaugle’s petition for writ of mandamus,” the opinion written by Justice Evan Jenkins states. “Therefore, we deny the requested writ to prohibit enforcement of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s October 21, 2019 order.”
Workman
Sponaugle is a Pendleton County delegate and attorney, but he filed the challenge as a private citizen challenging Justice’s residency. The governor lives in Lewisburg and commutes to the state Capitol in Charleston. Sponaugle contends the state Constitution requires the governor to reside in the seat of government while serving.
The case has been in limbo in Kanawha Circuit Court. Justice’s legal team had asked the Supreme Court to decide if the case should continue. The sides took part in oral arguments before the court in October. Now, the case will go into the discovery stage in King’s court.
Attorneys for Gov. Justice have argued the word “reside” in the state Constitution is discretionary.
Jenkins, who was serving as chief justice on the case because Tim Armstead recued himself, wrote that the word “reside” is not discretionary. The governor contends it is discretionary.
“In other words, the governor argues that … he must be able to come and go as the duties of his office require without interference or regulation from the courts,” Jenkins wrote. “And, that he is physically present in Charleston as often as he needs to be ‘as determined by the judgment, autonomy, and discretion inherent in his office.’
“We agree that, if mandamus were to regulate the comings and goings of the governor, such action would violate separation of powers principles. We disagree, however, that ‘residing’ is a matter of discretion, and we also disagree that granting mandamus to enforce the governor’s mandatory duty to reside in Charleston would take the form of regulating the comings and goings of the governor.”
The opinion says King can require Justice to reside in Charleston with a writ of mandamus, and it says King was correct to not dismiss the case.
“We hold that the duty of executive officers to reside at the seat of government, as required by Section 1 of Article VII of the West Virginia Constitution, is a mandatory, non-discretionary duty for which a writ of mandamus may lie to require compliance with that duty,” the opinion states. “The public has a reasonable expectation that its elected officials will uphold the duties of their offices/positions and follow the law, and writs of mandamus to compel compliance with these obligations will be issued when deemed necessary by the courts.
“Accordingly, given the high standard for the issuance of a writ of prohibition by this court, Governor Justice has failed to meet his burden to show that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers. He has not shown that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his motion to dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus, and as such, the petition for writ of prohibition must be denied.”
Justice Margaret Workman agreed with the ruling but wrote a concurring opinion to disagree with “what has become an oft-repeated error of a majority of this court to go beyond the issue presented to it and purport to determine legal issues neither properly before it nor informed by factual development below.”
“Dissatisfied, however, with merely leaving the lower court to do its work, the majority embarks on an historical narrative under the guise of further examination of these fairly straightforward and succinctly determined issues,” Workman writes. “However, as even the majority reminds, ‘[m]andamus, in its purest form, simply requires the official to perform the duty required of him.’
“Once the majority determined that the residency requirement is mandatory, there was nothing left for it to do except permit development of a factual record below regarding the governor’s compliance or lack thereof, as contemplated by the lower court. At no point did this petition for writ of prohibition lend itself to developing a definition for ‘reside’ in a vacuum — and a relatively impotent one at that.”
Workman says the majority’s syllabus point establishing a definition of “reside” is “as feckless as it is imposing.”
“As indicated, neither the lower court’s ruling, nor the instant writ of prohibition asked this court to create a definition; the petition merely asked this court to hold that the lower court exceeded its authority when it denied mandamus pending further factual development,” she wrote. “But since it was apparently determined to do so, at a minimum the majority could have provided a definition that would do more than simply perpetuate the elastic notions of ‘presence’ already predominating the narrative.
“By providing a formula that requires fulfillment of vague and still-undefined terms such as ‘liv[ing], primarily, at the seat of government’ and ‘principal place of physical presence,’ the majority has done little to advance the ball. …
“It bears reminding that ‘the cardinal principle of judicial restraint — if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more — counsels us to go no further.’
“The majority must develop some level of judicial discipline to curb its apparent eagerness to become involved in the merits of every case if this court is to retain its proper role.”
Justice John Hutchison dissented. Armstead recused himself from the case because of his time as speaker of the House of Delegates. Sponaugle, a Democrat, currently serves in the House, but his term is ending because he unsuccessfully ran for Attorney General in the primary election.
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals case number 19-1132