CHARLESTON — The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision and ruled that a convenience store was not liable for the death of a man who was hit by an impaired driver.
Justice John Hutchison authored the majority opinion, filed on June 8.
"From the outset, but to no avail, Speedway asserted that, as a matter of law, it had no legal duty to prevent Ms. Liggett from driving her vehicle because it did not engage in any affirmative conduct that caused or contributed to her impairment," Hutchison wrote. "The circuit court permitted the jury to consider whether Speedway was negligent in Mr. Jarrett’s death, and it found it to be 30% at fault."
In the case, Speedway was ordered to pay damages in excess of $2 million.
"Upon review of Speedway’s appeal of that verdict, and for the reasons stated below, we find that the circuit court erred in concluding that Speedway had a legal duty in this case and, accordingly, we conclude that Speedway is not liable for Mr. Jarrett’s death," Hutchison wrote. "We, therefore, reverse the circuit court’s order denying Speedway’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law."
Deborah L. Jarrett filed the initial lawsuit in 2015 for the death of Kevin Jarrett against Speedway, Carol Howard and Brandy L. Liggett
Liggett, who had been employed at Speedway for a total of three days, began her shift at Speedway on Sept. 15, 2015, at 6 a.m. and was observed several times throughout the day falling asleep while working by other employees.
Bobbie Jo Maguire asked if Liggett needed to go home and she declined the offer, saying she was just tired and thinking about things."
"Ms. Maguire testified that, aside from the three instances when she observed Ms. Liggett nodding off, she did not observe any other concerning behavior such as slurred speech or glassy eyes; that she believed Ms. Liggett when she said she was 'just tired'; that she had no reason to believe that Ms. Liggett was impaired; and that if she had suspected illegal drug use, she would have immediately contacted her district manager," the opinion states. "Similarly, Ms. Wells testified that, other than seeing Ms. Liggett nodding off outside, she saw no other signs that she might be impaired."
Liggett testified that for at least one year prior to the accident, she had been addicted to prescription medications that she purchased off the street and consumed illegally.
Liggett testified she had taken more drugs in the bathroom at Speedway during her shift but that no one, including her family or co-workers, knew she had a substance abuse problem, Hutchison wrote.
"Ms. Liggett testified that she did not ask for a ride home prior to the accident because she believed that she was capable of driving herself," the opinion stated. "She further testified that there were family members she could have called if she needed a ride, that she had money for a cab, and that if anyone from Speedway had offered her a ride, she would have refused and advised them that she was capable of driving herself."
After finishing her shift and then dropping off football equipment for her son, she was driving home and crossed the center line, colliding with the motorcycle driven by Kevin Jarrett, killing him.
Liggett subsequently tested positive for amphetamine, benzodiazepine, and buprenorphine. She pled guilty for driving under the influence causing death.
Deborah Jarrett then filed a complaint against claimed Liggett was in no condition to safely operate a motor vehicle, which was clear, open and obvious, but Speedway allowed her to do so.
While driving home on W.Va. 2, Liggett, who was operating a vehicle owned by Howard, crossed the center line and struck a motorcycle driven by Kevin Jarrett, causing him significant injuries and, ultimately, his death, according to the suit.
Deborah Jarrett claimed Liggett admitted she had no recollection of the actual impact of the accident and that she was asleep and/or unconscious at the time of the collision, likely due in part to being under the influence of drugs, as well as fatigue from working overtime.
After the accident, Liggett was drug tested and was found to have several controlled substances in her system, according to the suit.
Deborah Jarrett then filed her wrongful death lawsuit. She argued that Speedway knew that Liggett was clearly impaired and wrongly allowed her to leave the premises.
In the lawsuit, a Marshall County jury assessed fault of 30% against Speedway and 70% against Liggett.
Speedway was ordered to pay $268,204.50 with interest, court costs and jury fees.
Speedway then filed a renewed motion for judgment at a matter of law, arguing that it had no legal duty to prevent Liggett from driving herself home after work. The circuit court denied the motion but granted a post-trial motion for a partial new trial.
At the second trial on the limited damages issue, the jury awarded the respondent $5,862,323.
"The circuit court entered a second final judgment order that, with pre-judgment interest, awarded respondent a total amount of $6,676,744.38," the opinion states. "Speedway was ordered to pay $2,043,792.82 of that amount, plus post-judgment interest and various costs."
Speedway subsequently filed its final motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial on all issues under Rule 59, or to alter or amend the final judgment order under Rule 59(e) to correct the award of post-judgment interest.
The circuit court denied all of Speedway’s motions and Speedway then appealed to the Supreme Court.
"The evidence at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to respondent, failed to demonstrate that Speedway engaged in affirmative conduct that created an unreasonable risk of harm to the motoring public, including Mr. Jarrett," the opinion states.
Therefore, Speedway did not have a duty to exercise reasonable care in preventing Liggett from driving.
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals case number: 21-0215