CHARLESTON – The state Supreme Court has reversed and remanded a case in which a man filed a workers’ compensation claim and later a related civil lawsuit.
In its June 12 majority opinion, the court said the legal concept of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, means the employee could file the civil lawsuit in addition to a workers’ comp claim.
“"For purposes of issue preclusion, issues and procedures are not identical or similar if the second action involves application of a different legal standard or substantially different procedural rules, even though the factual settings of both suits may be the same,” Justice John Hutchison wrote in the June 12 majority opinion.
Chief Justice Tim Armstead was the lone dissent, saying the ruling could have “far-reaching effects.”
In the underlying matter, Michael D. Ruble filed a workers’ compensation claim against his employer RPM International in Lesage after he says he was exposed to toxic chemicals on the job from 1996 to 2018, causing neuropathy and dermatitis. He worked in the making of polyurethane stains, paint strippers, xylene, acetone and other paint-related products.
Starting in 2016 or 2017, Ruble says he began having breathing problems he attributed to his chemical exposure at work. By late 2017, he says he began showing symptoms of tremors, swollen hands and feet and numbness, weakness, memory problems and difficulty walking. He stopped working on May 1, 2018.
Ruble also filed a civil lawsuit against third-party manufacturers of the toxic chemicals.
In the workers’ comp case, it was determined Ruble failed to provide he developed an injury as a result of his employment. After that ruling, the third-party manufacturers filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis of collateral estoppel because the “issue had been resolved by the workers’ compensation administrative decision.” Cabell Circuit Judge Paul T. Farrell granted that motion.
Collateral estoppel is a legal theory that prevents the relitigation of an issue resolved in a previous lawsuit or administrative proceeding even if the issue relates to a different claim.
"We find that the workers’ compensation process involved legal standards and procedural rules that were substantially different from those in a courtroom, and that process did not afford the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the third-party manufacturers’ chemicals were a cause of his injury. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings," Hutchison wrote in the 4-1 majority opinion.
“Even though there are factual similarities between the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation proceeding and his claims in the circuit court, the procedural rules for developing those claims in the circuit court involved vastly different legal standards and procedural rules from those before the OOJ (Office of Judges for the workers’ comp claim). The record reflects that, when the plaintiff began both his lawsuit and his workers’ compensation claims, he was unable to identify the toxic materials to which he was exposed at the worksite or the manufacturers of those materials. Before the lawsuit was filed, the employer refused to produce this information.
“The procedural rules in the workers’ compensation system did not permit inspections of the plant, testing of the employer’s ventilation system or sampling of the air at employee workstations to assess where and how an employee might be exposed to toxic materials. Nor did the rules permit an employee to request that the employer produce documentary evidence of workplace conditions, or of prior inspections or citations by government regulatory agencies. Hence, the rules precluded the plaintiff from developing proof beyond his own statements and recollections as to the materials to which he was exposed.”
Hutchison also said damages are developed, proven and awarded in a workers’ compensation claim substantially differently from a civil claim, adding that difference affects how evidence is developed.
“In a workers’ compensation claim, in addition to medical benefits for the injury, the employee can usually only recover limited ‘damages’ in the form of temporary total disability (that provides a small percentage of the employee’s salary to pay bills while the employee is off work) and permanent partial disability (to compensate for any permanent physical impairments), both of which are calculated as a portion of the employee’s weekly wage (but are capped by the average weekly wage of all workers in West Virginia),” Hutchison wrote. “Attorney fees in workers’ compensation claims are capped at 20% of the equivalent to 208 weeks of benefits.
“Thus, with the combination of limited benefits and limited fees, our workers’ compensation statutory scheme disincentivizes a workers’ compensation lawyer from spending monies on discovery and experts likely to consume or exceed the employee’s recovery to prove a complicated third-party, toxic injury workers’ compensation claim, and to suggest otherwise is illogical.”
Hutchison said Ruble did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the causation of his injuries in the workers’ comp proceedings.
“The administrative law judge did not find the plaintiff did not have an injury, but rather found he could not prove an injury in the course of and as a result of his employment,” the majority opinion states. “Employees injured in the course of their job are supposed to be able to pursue workers’ compensation benefits quickly, recover enough to pay their medical bills, and gain wage replacement sufficient to keep bread on the table and the wolves away from the door.
“Upholding the circuit court’s dismissal would deter employees from seeking workers’ compensation until any third-party claims have been developed and resolved in a circuit court. This is directly contrary to the Legislature’s command that employees injured on the job by a third party are allowed to pursue both a workers’ compensation claim and a claim against the third party.”
In his dissenting opinion, Armstead said the majority ruling gives workers a second chance.
“The majority’s opinion will permit workers’ compensation claimants who have adverse causation determinations in their workers’ compensation cases to, nonetheless, proceed with filing civil actions in circuit court against third-party non-employers, essentially providing them a second 'bite at the apple' to prove causation,” Armstead wrote. “Because I believe that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits such relitigation of the issue of causation under the facts of this case, and the majority’s opinion may have a far reaching effects on the law related to issue preclusion that may not be initially apparent, I respectfully dissent.”
Ruble was represented by R. Dean Hartley, Mark Staun and David B. Lunsford of Hartley Law Group in Wheeling. The third-party defendant companies were represented by Ancil G. Ramey, James J.A. Mulhall and Dallas F. Kratzer III of Steptoe & Johnson (Matrix Chemical LLC); Rodney L. Baker II of Steptoe & Johnson (The Early Construction Company); Niall L. Paul and Charity K. Lawrence of Spilman Thomas & Battle (E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company); and Edward A. Smallwood, Leo G. Daly and Colby S. Bryson of Post & Schell (Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals, Nouryon Chemicals, Bayer Corporation and Bayer CropScience and Monsanto Company).
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals case number 22-0329